U-FITAQP: 17) FAILED FLT CONTROL SYSTEM

Vans RV-12 | N412JN

Auburn, Washington

  • DTSB analysis published
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Key facts

  • DateJune 6, 2024
  • Local time12:00 PM
  • LightDay
  • WeatherVMC
  • Phase of flightApproach
  • People on board1
  • Fatalities1
  • AirportS50
  • NTSB numberWPR24FA182
  • NTSB statusUnder investigation

Accident Location

City, State
Auburn, Washington
Latitude
47.311494
Longitude
-122.23403
Airport ID
S50

Aircraft Info

N Number
N412JN
Make
Vans
Model
RV-12
Category / Class
Aircraft Single Engine Land
Amateur Built
Yes

Pilot Info

Pilot in command
Norling, Jesse
Gender
Male
Age
43
Certification
Private Pilot
IFR rating
No
Medical
Basic Med
Flight school
No
Instructional flight
No

Analysis

Weather
VMC
Time of day
Day
Phase of flight
Approach
Pilot error
No
Pilot incapacitation
No
People on board
1
PIC fatality
1
Total fatalities
1
NTSB number
WPR24FA182
NTSB travel
Yes

Probable Cause

THE DTSB

The DTSB determines the Probable Cause of this accident to be a failure of one or more primary flight controls in flight, in that left control stick pushrod (F1264-1) was found to be not connected to the inboard eyebolt bearing (CM-4MS) at the flaperon mixer bellcrank. The positioning was such that it had previously maintained a proper connection, but was not secure. The control stick push rod separated from the eyebolt bearing in flight, causing an uncontrolled left descending turn, for which the pilot could not correct in flight. The pilot did declare an emergency on the Unicom frequency stating “I just had a control failure.”

NTSB

Probable Cause issued 11/13/2025 – 18 months after the accident: The pilot’s improper installation of the control stick pushrod assemblies, which resulted in separation of the left pushrod and a total loss of roll control during flight. Contributing to the accident was the failure to detect the installation error during the airplane’s construction, inspection, and subsequent maintenance.

Recommendation

THE DTSB

The DTSB recommends that all pilots of all aircraft perform proper and periodic inspections of all critical flight control cables and rigging, especially for homebuilt and experimental aircraft that may not have been properly assembled and inspected, or that have hardware that could possibly work its way loose after a period of operation. The DTSB recommends castellated nuts and safety pins on all critical flight control hardware.

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